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Abstract
We show that managerial delegation based upon comparative per-
formance may generate collusive outcomes observationally equivalent
to those typically associated with repeated games or cross ownership.
This happens when rivalsprots are positively weighted in the man-
agerial incentive scheme. We also identify the level of time discounting
at which a repeated game based upon Nash reversion would achieve
the same degree of collusion. Accordingly, such managerial contracts
should attract the attention of antitrust authorities.
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1 Introduction
Since the pioneering contributions by Vickers (1985) and Fershtman (1985),
the literature on strategic delegation has been growing signicantly and var-
ious types of managerial incentives have been put forward. We may roughly
group such incentives into three types, depending on whether, in addition
to its own prots, a rms objective function includes also output (Vick-
ers, 1985; Fershtman, 1985) or revenue (Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas,
1987), market share (Jansen et al., 2007, 2009; Ritz, 2008) or the rivals
prots (Salas Fumas, 1992; Lundgren, 1996, Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999;
Miller and Pazgal, 2001).
There exists a strand of literature focussing on the emergence of implicit
collusion among managerial rms in repeated games (Reitman, 1993; Spag-
nolo, 2000, 2005; Lambertini and Trombetta, 2002). Moreover, the possibility
for cross-ownership to generate collusive outcomes has also been investigated
in detail (Reynolds and Snapp, 1986; Malueg, 1992; Reitman, 1994; Gilo et
al., 2006).
What we want to illustrate is indeed that another route potentially repli-
cating collusion is represented by the use of delegation contracts based on
comparative performance as in Salas Fumas (1992), Lundgren (1996), Ag-
garwal and Samwick (1999) and Miller and Pazgal (2001). This is the case
whenever the weight attached in managerial contracts to rival rmsprots
is positive, which obtains at equilibrium under Bertrand competition in a
market for substitute goods. The source of this result is the following. As we
know from Miller and Pazgal (2001), the adoption of incentive based upon
comparative performance yields a unique subgame perfect equilibrium irre-
spective of the specic market variables being set by managers. Moreover, the
resulting prots are somewhere between those associated with the Bertrand
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and Cournot equilibria played by entrepreneurial rms. Hence, moving from
the pure Bertrand outcome to the managerialised one is equivalent to par-
tially colluding in prices, while it is procompetitive if the departure point is
Cournot. This partially collusive outcome also replicates that engendered by
systematic cross-ownership by the same amount in the entire industry.
In the remainder of the paper, we briey reconstruct the basic result in
Miller and Pazgal (2001) and then, using the folk theorem based on grim
trigger strategies (Friedman, 1971), illustrate the tacitly collusive supergame
reproducing the same result. Finally, at the empirical level a few relevant
facts highlighted by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) are worth recollecting.
According to their data, a positive weight is attached to rivalsprots also
in industries where capacity constraints bite (which typically fall under the
Cournot label), in contrast with the theoretical prediction. In summary, all
of this should draw the antitrust agenciesattention to industries in which
comparative performance is a key component of managerial incentives, as
what follows shows that this could be a relatively simple way of implementing
collusion without explicit agreements.
2 The model
Here we report the essential elements of Miller and Pazgals (2001) duopoly
model. Inverse and direct market demand functions can be appropriately
specied as Singh and Vives (1984),
pi = a  qi   qj (1)
qi =
a
1 + 
  pi
1  2 +
pj
1  2 (2)
depending on whether Cournot or Bertrand competition is considered. As
in Miller and Pazgal (2001), rmsmarginal cost is the same and constant.
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Therefore, without further loss of generality, it is set equal to zero. Hence,
the prot function of rm i is i = piqi, and the manager of rm i maximises
Mi = i + ij (3)
The game has a three-stage structure, with owners and managers playing
noncooperatively under imperfect, symmetric and complete information at
each stage. In the rst, owners decide whether to hire managers or not; in the
second, any owner who has decided to separate control from ownership sets
the delegation contract to maximise prots; in the third, market competition
takes place, given the decisions taken at the two former stages. The solution
concept is subgame perfection by backward induction.
2.1 The Cournot industry
Firms are quantity-setters, and the prot function of rm j writes
j = (a  qj   qi) qj (4)
so that the manager of rm i chooses output qi to maximise
fMi = i   iqiqj (5)
which generates the following rst order condition (FOC):
@Mi
@qi
=
@i
@qi
+ i  @j
@qi
= 0 (6)
which is equivalent to
@fMi
@qi
=
@i
@qi
  iqj = 0 (7)
Clearly, i > 0 (resp., i < 0) exerts an anticompetitive (procompetitive)
e¤ect. That is, in order for proper comparative performance to emerge at
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equilibrium, i must be negative. Otherwise, what is nominally a comparative
performance evaluation mechanism is in fact a collusive one.
The resulting best reply function of rm i in the quantity space is
qi (qj) =
a  qj (1 + i)
2
(8)
telling that delegation modies its slope
@qi (qj)
@qj
=   (1 + i)
2
(9)
Hence, comparative performance takes the form of a rotation of the reaction
function.
Under unilateral delegation, the Cournot-Stackelberg outcome obtains
with an optimal contract identied by
N (m; e) =    (2  )
4   (2 + ) < 0 (10)
and the corresponding rmsequilibrium prots are
CN (m; e) =
a2 (2  )2
8 (2  2) ; 
CN (e;m) =
a2 [4   (2 + )]2
16 (2  2)2 (11)
which indeed correspond to the Cournot-Stackelberg prots. If  = 1, then
N (m; e) =  1: That is, under product homogeneity unilateral delegation
illustrates the emergence of pure comparative performance evaluation at the
asymmetric equilibrium.
If both rms delegate, the subgame perfect contract is identied by
N (m;m) =   
2 + 
< 0 (12)
and per-rm equilibrium output and prots are
qCN (m;m) =
a (2 + )
4 (1 + )
CN (m;m) =
a2 (4  2)
16 (1 + )
(13)
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As we know from Singh and Vives (1984), the Cournot-Nash prots of the
game played by entrepreneurial rms are CN (e; e) = a2= (2 + )2. Hence,
the rst stage of the game looks as in Matrix 1.
j
m e
i m
a2(4 2)
16(1+)
;
a2(4 2)
16(1+)
a2(2 )2
8(2 2) ;
a2[4 (2+)]2
16(2 2)2
e a
2[4 (2+)]2
16(2 2)2 ;
a2(2 )2
8(2 2)
a2
(2+)2
; a
2
(2+)2
Matrix 1: Cournot competition
The inspection of Matrix 1 implies that strategy m is dominant, and
therefore (m;m) is the unique equilibrium in pure strategies. Additionally,
Matrix 1 reproduces the prisonersdilemma structure, since CN (m;m) <
CN (e; e) for all  2 (0; 1].
2.2 The Bertrand industry
Assume now that rms choose prices, the relevant individual demand func-
tion being (2). In the asymmetric case in which rm i is managerial and rm
j is entrepreneurial, equilibrium prices at the third stage are
pBNi =
a (1  ) [2 +  (1 + i)]
4  2 (1 + i) ; p
BN
j =
a (1  ) (2 + )
4  2 (1 + i) (14)
The optimal contract chosen by the owner of rm i is
Ni =
 (2 + )
4 +  (2  ) > 0 (15)
and the resulting prots are
BN (m; e) =
a2 (1  ) (2 + )2
8 (1 + ) (2  2) ; 
BN (e;m) =
a2 (1  ) [    (2  )]2
16 (1 + ) (2  2)2
(16)
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When both rms are managerial, one can solve for optimal prices and
then nd out the optimal symmetric delegation contract at the second stage:
N (m;m) =

2   > 0 (17)
which reveals that, under price competition, the optimal contract has an an-
ticompetitive avour. As established by Miller and Pazgal (2001), the equi-
librium outcome of this case is observationally equivalent to that generated,
all else equal, under Cournot competition:
qBN (m;m) = qCN (m;m) =
a (2 + )
4 (1 + )
BN (m;m) = CN (m;m) =
a2 (4  2)
16 (1 + )
(18)
The equilibrium level of the market price is
pBN (m;m) =
a (2  )
4
(19)
The remaining case in which both rms are entrepreneurial yields the follow-
ing equilibrium prots:
BN (e; e) =
a2 (1  )
(1 + ) (2  )2 (20)
A few relevant remarks are in order:
 Under Bertrand behaviour, the rst stage of the game (see Matrix 2)
produces (m;m) as the unique equilibrium, and the upstream stage is
not a prisonersdilemma, as BN (e; e) < BN (m;m).
j
m e
i m
a2(4 2)
16(1+)
;
a2(4 2)
16(1+)
a2(1 )(2+)2
8(1+)(2 2) ;
a2(1 )[ (2 )]2
16(1+)(2 2)2
e a
2(1 )[ (2 )]2
16(1+)(2 2)2 ;
a2(1 )(2+)2
8(1+)(2 2)
a2(1 )
(1+)(2 )2 ;
a2(1 )
(1+)(2 )2
Matrix 2: Bertrand competition
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 The fact that delegation turns out to be a collusive instrument also
arises from the delegation schemes used by Vickers (1985), Fershtman
and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), as well as in vertical relations
based on two-part tari¤s as in Bonanno and Vickers (1988).
 However, while in all of the aforementioned literature all prots become
nil at  = 1, in the Miller and Pazgal (2001) model this does not
happen, which means that the anticompetitive e¤ect of comparative
performance-based managerial incentives under Bertrand competition
is stronger than that associated with output or revenues and survives
to product homogeneity.
3 The mixed case
The scenario in which rm i is a quantity-setter and rm j is a price-setter
can be quickly dealt with. The Nash equilibrium prots accruing to entre-
preneurial rms are
qN (e; e) =
a2 (2  )2 (1  2)
(4  32)2 ; 
pN (e; e) =
a2 [2   (1  )]2
(4  32)2 (21)
In both cases, at the subgame perfect equilibrium rms delegate control to
managers, as we know from Miller and Pazgal (2001). Comparing qN (e; e)
and pN (e; e) with BN (m;m) = CN (m;m), one nds pN (e; e) > BN (m;m) =
CN (m;m) everywhere, whereas qN (e; e) R BN (m;m) = CN (m;m) for
all  R 0:838. This implies that the rst stage of the game is not a prisoners
dilemma for either rm as soon as product substitutability is high enough.
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4 Ranking and assessment of equilibria
Leaving aside the mixed case, we may look at the positions of the relevant
equilibria in the prot space, as in Figure 1, where  is monopoly prot
and points B and C identify the Bertrand and Cournot equilibria without
managers, while point M locates the equilibrium reached when both rms
delegate control to managers. This illustrates intuitively that moving from
C to M makes the industry more competitive, while moving from B to M
looks collusive or replicates the outcome of cross-ownership.
Figure 1 The frontier of industry prots and equilibria
6
-
1
2
2 =   1
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
B
M
C
 
 
 
 
 
  
Therefore, managerialisation under Bertrand competition is a shortcut to
implement an equilibrium that, otherwise, would be reachable in a supergame
between entrepreneurial rms, provided a very specic relationship between
time preferences and product di¤erentiation holds. To see this, it su¢ ces
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to gure out the supergame in prices governed by Friedmans (1971) grim
trigger strategies.
We are about to identify the critical level of the discount factor  such
that, if rms have exactly that discount factor in mind, the supergame ruled
by the innite Nash reversion after any deviation from the collusive path
enables them to get exactly the same per-period prots as those associated
to the Bertrand equilibrium under bilateral managerialisation.
The generic individual collusive prots are c = pc (a  pc) = (1 + ) : If
rm i sticks to the collusive price pc while the other deviates, this can happen
in two ways.1 The rst is a deviation that brings the cheated rms quantity
to zero:
qi
 
pc; pd

= 0, pd0 =
pc   a (1  )

(22)
yielding
d0 =
(a  pc) [pc   a (1  )]
2
(23)
This holds for low levels of product di¤erentiation. The second type of devi-
ation, which becomes relevant provided di¤erentiation is high enough, takes
place along the cheating rms best reply, at the following price:
pdbr =
a (1  ) + pc
2
(24)
which yields
dbr =
[a (1  ) + pc]2
4 (1  2) (25)
The stability condition is
c
1    
d
k +
BN (e; e)
1   ; k = 0; br (26)
1The baerings of product di¤erentiation on the optimal deviation from collusive pric-
ing has been extensively debated. See Deneckere (1983); Majerus (1988); Ross (1992);
Lambertini (1997); Albæk and Lambertini (1998, 2004), inter alia.
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Henceforth, we pose pc = pBN (m;m) = pCN (m;m) and solve the two ver-
sions of (26) w.r.t. :
If k = 0; (26) delivers the following critical threshold of the discount
factor:
c0 =
(2  )2 [4  32 (1 + )  4]
16 (1  ) + 2 [2 (5  3)  8] (27)
while if k = br; we have
cbr =
 (2  )2
16 (1  ) + 3 (28)
Since, for pc = pBN (m;m) = pCN (m;m) ; pdbr = p
d
0 at  = 0:881, it turns out
that also cbr = 
c
0 at the same level of product substitutability. The resulting
picture appears in Figure 2.
Figure 2 The critical theshold of 
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The inspection of Figure 2 tells that, for all  at least as high as the
envelope of cbr and 
c
0, entrepreneurial Bertrand rms could stabilise par-
tial collusion in correspondence of prots at least as large as BN (m;m) =
CN (m;m). If this is not the case, they may use strategic delegation based
upon this peculiar form of comparative performance evaluation to locate
themselves along the envelope, for any given value of .
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) use the same theoretical model as in Miller
and Pazgal (2001) in both Bertrand and Cournot settings,2 and the resulting
predictions are then tested using a large data set covering a wide range of
di¤erent industries. While the model predicts a negative (positive) relation
between a managers remuneration and the rival rmsprots under Cournot
(Bertrand) competition, the data seem to suggest persistently a positive link,
disconrming the presence of comparative performance-based contracts, in-
dependently of the specic nature of the industry. For instance, Aggarwal
and Samwick (1999, p. 2002) nd ... that both own- and rival-rm pay-
performance sensitivities are positive for total compensation. If this applies
fairly systematically in industries ranging from food and tobacco (resembling
Bertrand) to chemicals, petroleum and machinery (Cournot), their ndings
seem to suggest that the rms involved use delegation in a pro-collusive way
even when this is not literally driven by Bertrand competition as the the-
oretical model would predict. Hence, any empirical evidence of this kind
emerging in industries where capacity constraints matter, should attract the
attention of antitrust agencies.
It is worth stressing two aspects: the rst is that this class of models
requires managerial contracts to be observable (see, e.g., Fershtman et al.,
1991); the second is that they usually are, in view of the rules imposed to
2But their calculations are incorrect as they do not invert the demand system and just
replace prices with quantities without manipulating parametric coe¢ cients.
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large corporations. Hence, the information about the structure of managerial
incentives would reveal the intention to mimic collusion or cross ownership
if a positive weight is assigned to rivals prots. Moreover, in a Cournot
industry, managers should react by expanding capacity to increase output
levels. In Bertrand industries, they would instead either leave some capacity
idle or dismantle portions of installed capacity. Hence, observing variations
in installed capacity would be in itself suggestive of the presence of a possible
problem connected with anti-competitive practices.
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